Landmark Supreme Court Cases: First Amendment Rights and Limits
Pivotal summaries defining speech, expression, and access to information in schools and public life.
**These summaries are for educational purposes and should not be considered legal advice. The full legal texts of the rulings should be consulted for comprehensive understanding.**
Student Speech and Expression Limits
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969)
This case centered on students wearing black armbands to silently protest the Vietnam War. The central finding of the Supreme Court affirmed students' constitutional rights within the school environment.
‘On Feb. 24, 1969, the court ruled 7-2 that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”’
— Quote from ACLU
Crucially, the ruling still allows for limits. Students cannot violate rules that are not targeted at expression (like attendance policies) if they are applied equally. Most importantly, students cannot “materially disrupt” the functioning of their school.
Source: ACLU
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986)
Matthew N. Fraser was suspended for delivering an obscene and provocative speech nominating a classmate for school office.
Primary Holding:
The Supreme Court held that the student's free speech rights were not violated. Students **do not** have a First Amendment right to make **obscene or vulgar speeches** in school. The ruling confirmed that schools can prohibit speech that is inconsistent with their basic educational mission.
Source: US Courts
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988)
Students in a Journalism II class wrote stories on teen pregnancy and divorce for the school-sponsored newspaper, *The Spectrum*. The principal deleted the pages prior to publication without telling the students.
Primary Holding:
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled **5-3 against the students**, holding that the principal's actions did not violate free speech rights. The Court reasoned that because the paper was **school-sponsored** and intended as a limited forum for a class, the school had a legitimate interest in preventing the publication of articles that were deemed inappropriate or which might appear to carry the school's official approval.
Source: US Courts
Library and Curriculum Access Disputes
Board of Education v. Pico (1982)
A New York school board removed nine books (including *Slaughterhouse-Five*) from libraries after a community group called them "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic and just plain filthy." Students sued, claiming the books were removed based on the board's political tastes.
Primary Holding:
The Supreme Court ruled in the students’ favor, holding that the **right to read is implied by the First Amendment**. A public school cannot restrict access to materials simply because it disagrees with the content. The board cannot remove books from shelves simply because they "dislike the ideas contained in those books."
Source: Bill of Rights Institute
Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School Board (1995)
The St. Tammany Parish School Board voted **12-2** to remove the book ***Voodoo & Hoodoo*** from all public school libraries after a parent complained it "heightened children's infatuation with the supernatural and incited students to try the explicit 'spells.'" Two prior committees had recommended retaining the book with restricted access.
Primary Holding and Conclusion:
The appellate court **reversed the district court’s summary judgment** that declared the removal unconstitutional, and **remanded the case** for further proceedings. Citing *Pico*, the court ruled that the School Board’s decision concerned a **non-curricular matter** and was subject to constitutional limitation. However, the record was not sufficiently developed to declare, as a matter of law, that the board's action was substantially based on an **unconstitutional motivation** (i.e., simply disliking the ideas).
Source: FindLaw
Counts v. Cedarville School District (2003)
A local school board voted **3-2** to restrict access to the **Harry Potter book series** in school libraries, requiring students to have a signed parental permission statement to check them out. The board members who voted for the restriction had read few, if any, of the books.
The students argued that the permission requirement created a burden and stigmatized those who read the books.
Primary Holding:
The District Court found the restrictions unconstitutional. Citing *Pico*, the court ruled that the board's restriction was motivated by a dislike of the ideas (witchcraft) and not legitimate pedagogical concerns. The court also affirmed that the **burden of parental consent** constituted a sufficient injury for students to have standing to sue.
Source: Justia Law
Case v. Unified School District 908 (1995)
Plaintiffs challenged the removal of the book ***Annie on My Mind*** from school libraries. The book, which had been on shelves for years, was challenged after a new superintendent intervened in the district's book review procedures regarding donated books.
Primary Holding:
The court concluded that the book's removal was **unconstitutional**. The decision reiterated the *Pico* standard that school boards cannot remove books from school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek to "prescribe what shall be orthodox."
Source: Justia Law
Gonzales v. Douglas (2017)
This litigation challenged the 2011 elimination of the **Mexican American Studies (MAS) program** in Tucson, Arizona, which was designed to engage Mexican-American students and close the achievement gap. A group of teachers claimed the ban was enacted with **racial animus**.
Primary Holding:
The court **successfully overturned the ban**, finding that while school curriculum decisions generally fall under "legitimate pedagogical concerns," a First Amendment violation can be established if the reasons offered by the state mask **illicit motivations**, such as a desire to suppress ideas or exhibit racial bias. Students retain a First Amendment right to receive information and ideas in the curriculum context, following the precedent set in *Pico*.
Source: Quimbee
Obscenity, Pornography, and Protecting Minors
Miller v. California (1973) - The Obscenity Test
Appellant was convicted of mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of a California statute. The Supreme Court established the definitive test for obscenity, which is not protected by the First Amendment.
Primary Holding:
The Court established the **three-part test** for obscenity. A work may be subject to state regulation if, **taken as a whole**:
- The average person, applying contemporary **community standards**, would find that the work appeals to the **prurient interest**.
- The work depicts or describes, in a **patently offensive way**, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law.
- The work **lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value** (**SLAPS test**).
This case rejected the previous, more stringent "utterly without redeeming social value" standard.
Source: Justia
Ginsberg v. New York (1968) - Obscenity for Minors
A store owner was convicted under a New York statute for selling "girlie" magazines (depicting nudity deemed **"harmful to minors"**) to a 16-year-old boy. The material was **not** considered obscene for adults.
Primary Holding:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that it is **constitutionally permissible** for a state to accord minors a **more restricted right** than adults to access sex-related material.
The State has the power to adjust the definition of obscenity as applied to minors, based on its independent interest in protecting the welfare of children and supporting parents' authority in raising their children.
Source: Justia
New York v. Ferber (1982) - Child Pornography (Actual Children)
This case concerned a New York statute prohibiting the promotion of material depicting the **sexual performance by a child under 16**. The case involved selling films of young boys masturbating.
Primary Holding:
The Supreme Court ruled the statute did **not** violate the First Amendment. The court held that child pornography depicting **actual children** is a category of material that falls **outside the First Amendment's protection**.
This material does not require the *Miller v. California* obscenity standard for prohibition, due to the compelling state interest in protecting children from the physical and psychological harm caused by production.
Source: Cornell Law School
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) - Virtual Child Pornography
This case challenged the **Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA)**, which criminalized the production, distribution, or possession of "virtual" child pornography—images that "appear to be of a minor" but are created without using actual children (e.g., computer-generated or morphed adult images).
Primary Holding:
The Supreme Court **struck down the CPPA provisions**, ruling that they were **overbroad** and violated the First Amendment.
The Court found that unlike the materials in *Ferber*, which involved real children, **virtual images** do not involve the same compelling state interest in protecting children from physical abuse during production. Prohibiting images simply because they *appear* to be of minors could criminalize protected speech, such as art or literary depictions, that are not obscene under the *Miller* test.
Source: Cornell Law School
Advocacy and Incitement to Lawless Action
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) - The Incitement Test
Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader, was convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute for advocating violence. The Supreme Court established a more protective standard for political speech.
Primary Holding:
The Supreme Court held that the state cannot forbid advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where such advocacy is:
- **Directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action**; AND
- **Likely to incite or produce such action.**
Since the Ohio statute merely punished the advocacy of violence without distinguishing it from incitement to *imminent* lawless action, it was deemed unconstitutional.
Source: Justia